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Strategic debates have long characterized the discourse on military affairs. Three lively
disputes concern: 1) Whether set “principles of war” can be codified and mastered;
2) The relative strengths and limitations of maritime and continental power; and 3)
The potential for waging successful “short wars.” Carl von Clausewitz provided the
sharpest critique of the principles of war, arguing that “friction” can overwhelm even
highly refined military art. A.T. Mahan’s concept of sea power was challenged by
Halford Mackinder’s theory of “heartland power.” Short-war notions animated by
Moltke the Elder’s victories in the 19th Century German wars of unification, and
expanded upon by his successors, were rebutted by Ivan Bloch. Each debate remains
relevant: technological advances prompt reappraisal of principles of war; the rise of
China and the resurgence of Russia as great continental powers challenge American
naval mastery; and insurgents and terrorists continue to prove the value of “long wars.”
Introduction
Throughout the long history of conflict, there have been many duels between “great cap-
tains.” Scipio v. Hannibal, Wallenstein v. Gustavus Adolphus, Montcalm v. Wolfe, Napoleon
v. Wellington, Grant v. Lee, and Rommel v. Montgomery are some of the best known. But
there have been many others. And away from the battlefield, “inside the tent,” there have
also been many great intellectual duels. Call them wars of ideas about the idea of war.
These remain somewhat less closely examined than the decisive campaigns of the finest
commanders; but the debates they have sparked have often had just as profound effects on
the course of history. For nations have girded themselves and gone to war in particular ways
based on their ideas about war. And so there is merit in understanding the context, content,
and consequences of the debates about military and security affairs that, in our view, have
so profoundly shaped and continue to mold the world system.
Strategic debates can be found at least as far back as the fifth century B.C.E., when
Themistocles had to overcome his fellow Athenians’ preference for relying primarily on
heavy infantry and convince them to invest in building a navy against the looming Persian
threat. His opponents bitterly resisted the idea, noting that their hoplites had beaten the
Persians handily at Marathon. Themistocles countered with the argument that, until Greeks
commanded the sea, the Persians could keep coming back, and might one day conquer. This
line of thought finally prevailed, a substantial fleet was built, and a great naval victory was
won at Salamis, crippling the second major Persian expeditionary force that had invaded
Greece within a decade.
This article not subject to U.S. copyright law.
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186 J. Arquilla and R. Nomura
Salamis ensured the salvation of Athens, the future of an independent Greece and, as
some have argued, enabled the very rise of the West as well.1 Nevertheless, many resented
Themistocles because, as Plutarch summarized, “he took away from the Athenians the
spear and the shield, and bound them to the bench and the oar.”2 And so, for all the success
he had made possible, Themistocles fell prey to his enemies’ lingering resentments and
wound up an exile, first from Athens, later from Greece, ending his days in service to the
Persian Empire as a provincial governor in Asia Minor. The ultimate irony.
Some seven centuries later the Roman emperor Gratian won an argument in favor of
making his armies more mobile on the march by ridding his soldiers of their heavy body
armor. But he began a process that lost all when Roman troops ever after became easy prey
to barbarian horse archers. In Gibbon’s words, they “overwhelmed the naked and trembling
legions,” enjoying a military advantage that “may be considered as the immediate cause of
the downfall of the empire.”3
In more recent history, there was a high-level debate that led to the American shift
away from emphasizing small numbers of military advisors, “combined action platoons,”
and other unconventional warfare tactics in Vietnam, to reliance on a “big-unit war.” The
result was an increase in destruction and in the “body count” of insurgents killed in action,
but without concomitant strategic gains being generated against an enemy “that attacked in
small units on its own initiative . . . ” and “was simultaneously nowhere and everywhere.”4
In the end, the big units could not quell the insurgency and the war was given up for lost.
The cautionary lesson here is that sometimes those who have won the debates have
gone on to lose the wars. Clearly, the quality and clarity of the discussion matters. Thus,
there are compelling reasons to examine the great strategic debates that have steered the
course of military affairs. While, as noted, they may have informed and guided the approach
to conflict since ancient times, it is really just during the past two hundred years that these
discourses have become highly refined, and have had broad, persistent effects in their own
eras and beyond.
With this in mind, we focus on three debates that have steered—but also sometimes
misguided—the profession of arms since the end of the Napoleonic era in 1815. Put most
concisely, they address: canonical principles v. “a genius for war”; sea v. land power; and
notions of short v. long wars. Most of the debates that have flowed from these topics have
featured leading protagonists on each side; and so this brief survey is also to some small
extent a story of individual thinkers as well as of schools of thought. From the start, we
note, the intellectual battle lines have been sharply drawn—as they should be in any good
debate, much less in ones with such life-and-death consequences.
Principles v. “Genius”
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, a Napoleonic-era staff officer, was hardly the first but was
surely the most articulate advocate for codifying the principles of war.5 He distilled from
his experiences, observations, others’ works, and historical ruminations such notions as
“interior lines” (having one’s unified force poised between the separated forces of one’s
enemies), the profound potential of logistical matters to shape the face of battle, and the
concept of maneuvering so as to concentrate more of one’s own forces against a smaller
proportion of the enemy’s at a to-be-determined “decisive point.”6
The U.S. military was well exposed to his thinking by the mid-nineteenth century, and
the nine canonical principles that all American military leaders still learn—the objective,
the offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, simplicity, security,
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in the introduction to the 1862 edition of The Art of War, which was then being used as
a text at West Point. As Henry Halleck, a senior Union general in the Civil War, put it:
“General Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics
and historians of this or any other day.”7 High praise indeed.
Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian soldier and philosopher of war, was a contemporary
and sharp critic of Jomini. He had considerable field experience, which no doubt influenced
his belief that the inherent difficulties of battle created “friction” and a knowledge-depriving
“fog of war” that would override any attempt to adhere to formal principles. Instead, he
argued, in almost mystic terms, that only “genius” could master the psychological and
strategic challenges of war.
This perspective—a dominant theme in Clausewitz’s On War—took deep root in the
Prussian/German military, and was built upon by Moltke the Elder, the architect of the
great victories against Austria (1866) and France (1870–71). Commenting on Clausewitz’s
notion of friction, Moltke famously observed: “No plan of operations extends with certainty
beyond the first encounter.”8 From this perspective, it seems that only individuals with the
highest reasoning powers can find the path to victory in war. As Clausewitz put it, they
must have “gifts of mind and temperament that in combination . . . constitute the essence
of military genius.”9
Interestingly, this strategic debate mirrored a larger cultural one between Enlightenment
thinkers, who believed that science, structure, and rationalism could solve virtually all
problems, and Romantics who reacted to and resisted the notion that the world could be
mastered by reason, believing instead in the deep power of human will and emotion to
prevail over and against all obstacles. Clausewitz’s emphasis that “the passions that are
to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people”10 resonated strongly with
Romanticist thought. And during his lifetime—he died in 1831—the Romantics had great
influence. But it didn’t last. As the noted historian of strategic thought Azar Gat has
observed, “By the 1840s . . . the tide of Romanticism was ebbing throughout Europe, and
it was the descendants of the Enlightenment who dominated the mid-century.”11
In the military realm during this period, the preeminence of Jominian rationalism
extended to the United States—as we can see in Halleck’s abovementioned assessment of
The Art of War—encompassing leaders on both sides during the Civil War.12 Not only did
Jomini’s ideas dominate, but, later on when Clausewitz’s work became better known, some
of the key formulations from On War were coopted and reshaped to fit into a framework
of “principles.” For example, some have tried to assert the similarity between Clausewitz
and Jomini in the matter of “decisive points.” But this is a notion about which Jomini was
detailed, systematic, and hortatory; Clausewitz was, at best, terse, vague, and elusive when
he asserted: “The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the
decisive point.”13 Where Jomini created a clear typology based on the notion that decisive
points derived both from geographic position and from the maneuvers of opposing forces
in the field, Clausewitz remained slippery, at times describing “decisiveness” in positional
terms, on other occasions referring to this factor temporally, as the “culminating point”
when the initiative moved from one side to the other.
It is one of the bitter ironies of strategic thought that someone like Clausewitz, who
abhorred dogma, should end up having so many of his ideas poured into Jominian molds.
To make matters worse, his principal audience of professional soldiers got him almost
completely wrong early on, the most egregious error being an extreme overemphasis on
his ideas about “battle.” Seizing upon a few catchphrases (e.g., “There is only one means
in war: combat”),14 late-nineteenth-century and twentieth-century generals all too often





































188 J. Arquilla and R. Nomura
What was and continues to be missed here is Clausewitz’s strong emphasis on the
requirement to seek out battle under advantageous conditions—both material and psycho-
logical. Liddell Hart goes on to note that this sort of misinterpretation arose easily out of the
abstruse philosophizing that Clausewitz routinely engaged in: “Not one reader in a hundred
was likely to follow the subtlety of his logic.”16 True enough.
Jomini, on the other hand, had a gift for clarity of thought and expression—which is
perhaps why his ideas caught on so widely. And his views were not only attractive among
generals; Jomini’s geometric approach to strategy had particular appeal in naval settings
as well. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American apostle of sea power, can be clearly seen
as a disciple of Jomini—as was his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, a professor at West Point
prior to the Civil War. The son’s ideas were to have, and to some extent still retain, a wide
global appeal that will be discussed next in our consideration of the sea power v. land
power debate. In the particular case of A. T. Mahan, though, as it pertains to this debate,
it should be sufficient, as Philip Crowl has noted, that the “ingredients of Jomini’s art of
war . . . were to be borrowed by Mahan to form the framework of his own system of naval
strategy.”17
More broadly speaking about Jomini’s appeal, however, the very idea of having “prin-
ciples of war” is soothing, as it suggests that there is indeed a practical path to the mastery
of military affairs. This remains something of an ideal, and in recent years efforts have been
mounted to look at just which principles of war may still apply to, or have to be amended
to deal with, challenges likely to arise in information-age conflicts and irregular wars.18
On balance, it seems clear that Jomini’s Enlightenment-oriented perspective has carried
the day against Clausewitz. As John Shy has observed, ironically, Clausewitz’s name is
“known even to those ignorant of history, but Jomini is familiar only to military specialists,
although his influence on both military theory and popular conceptions of warfare has
been enormous.”19 Given the hecatombs of the world wars, and the wildly successful spate
of anti-colonial and other irregular conflicts ever since, one has to question the enduring
value of Jominian principles. For it seems that Clausewitz’s emphases on complexity and
the psychological domain, especially notions of “the passions of the people”—the first
element he mentions in his “trinity of war”20—are more relevant to our troubled times. It is
thus somewhat galling that Clausewitz’s fame rests, all too heavily, on a few longstanding
misconceptions about his core ideas. But by returning to and accurately parsing his true
message, we may yet find insights of exceptional present—and future—value.
Sea v. Land Power
Among the more persistent historical patterns of conflict have been the recurring struggles
that have arisen between land-based and maritime-oriented powers. In ancient times, Persia
v. Greece, Sparta v. Athens, and Rome v. Carthage come quickly to mind. In all three cases,
the land powers had to “go to sea” in order to win, respectively, the Persian, Peloponnesian,
and Punic Wars. Sea power was also crucial to the very survival of the Byzantine Empire,
which outlasted Rome by a thousand years—falling in the end only when the Imperial
navy had crumbled into disrepair, and no rescuing fleet came from the West to relieve the
Ottoman siege and tight maritime blockade of Constantinople in 1453.21
The following century, and extending for some four hundred years thereafter, Britain
became the quintessential naval power, confronting, in succession, protracted challenges
from primarily land-based foes: Spain (sixteenth century); France (seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries); and Germany (nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries).22 Each,
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period during the American Revolution when a French fleet succeeded in isolating British
forces at Yorktown, leading to their capture.
In the wake of World War II, the United States became the leading maritime state,
and spent forty years dealing with the threat posed by the land-oriented Soviet Union. The
Cold War never turned into a hot global conflict, and so the threat the Red Navy posed to
American naval mastery never matured into action. But today Russian naval capabilities
remain robust, and Moscow is clearly still an important player in world affairs—as has
been borne out by the events of recent years in Syria, Iran, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the primary new naval challenge seems to be coming from China, yet another
classic continental power dipping its toe in the sea.
To A. T. Mahan, it seemed obvious that sea–land rivalries extended from ancient to
modern times. Jomini’s ideas—in particular the precise geometric elements—fit very neatly
into Mahan’s studies of British sea power covering the period from the seventeenth-century
Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars to the Napoleonic era.23 Though situated on the outer edge of
Europe, Britain nevertheless enjoyed Jomini’s favored “interior position,” given that the
Royal Navy could interpose itself between any single power, or hostile alliance, trying to
unite fleets that had first to transit the North Sea, the Atlantic, and/or the Mediterranean.
For Mahan, naval mastery was the key to great power, and to ensuring victory in large-
scale wars. Like Themistocles, Mahan believed that who commanded the sea commanded
all. As to the benefits of maritime dominance during a conflict, Mahan was very much in
agreement with Francis Bacon, who put the matter in these terms at the dawn of British sea
power: “Thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may
take as much and as little of the war as he will.”24
Mahan was also drawn to two of Jomini’s other important concepts: the emphasis
on concentration of forces—which led him to formulate the aphorism “Don’t divide the
fleet!”—and appreciation of the profound connection between logistics and the conduct of
battle.25 There is also a significant strand in Mahan’s thinking devoted to the straightforward
notion that whoever controls the sea will be in better position to win longer wars, because
holding the maritime advantage allows one to draw on the trade, wealth, and resources of the
world, whereas land-based opponents have more limited capacities that can be worn down
by blockade. For all these ties to Jominian thought, however, Jon Sumida has insightfully
observed, in the specific matter of “command in war,” as opposed to the more general
notions of command of the sea, that Mahan’s “greater emphasis on art than on science
[e.g., as can be seen in his Types of Naval Officers] resembled Clausewitz rather than
Jomini.”26
Like Jomini before him, Mahan, who poured out a steady stream of books and articles
from 1890–1914, enjoyed tremendous popularity. He was loved in Britain for affirming the
wisdom of British grand strategy, and widely admired at home and in Japan and Germany
for having shared the secret of how to rise to the first rank of nations.27 However, the
emergence of these new sea powers inevitably undermined the preeminent position of the
Royal Navy, leading, in the years before World War I, to a serious battleship-building race
with Germany and an uneasy Anglo-Japanese alliance.
Tensions with the United States during this era were relatively mild by comparison, but
did spike during the Anglo-Venezuelan crisis of 1895. In France there was a more curious
response: instead of building large battle fleets as Mahan urged, the French navy, guided
by the off-design thinkers of the Jeune École, such as Admiral Aube, at first focused much
more on development of swift, light coastal vessels capable of firing torpedoes. Minelaying
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It is also interesting to note that Mahan used his studies of the pre-industrial age of sail
to try to guide naval thought for a machine age. He dealt with this problem by asserting
that:
While many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress
of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain
constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the
rank of general principles.29
But this finesse that allowed Mahan to slip past the possibly unique problems posed by
changing technology could not work as easily against a fresh challenge emanating from the
great British geographer, Halford Mackinder, whose framework for analysis and criticism
relied on belief in the enduring features of an everlasting struggle to control the Eurasian
“heartland.”
As Mackinder argued in his famous 1904 article, this great land mass was, and con-
tinued to be, “the pivot region of the world’s politics.”30 Surrounding it was an “inner
crescent” running from Western Europe through the Middle East and on to South and East
Asia. The United States was relegated to the “outer crescent,” reflecting its insularity. Later,
as Mackinder’s ideas became even more crystallized, he stated his fundamental argument
in the form of three closely linked hypotheses: “Who rules East Europe commands the
Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island [i.e., Europe, Asia, and
Africa]; and Who rules the World-Island commands the world.”31 These three assertions
grew from Mackinder’s belief that the latest advances in technology—particularly in attack
from the air and rapid transportation of forces on the ground—were favoring land powers
over sea powers; Britain’s long run of global leadership, in his view, was in danger of
ending.
Given that Mackinder wrote his three key formulations just after World War I,
twenty years before the Nazi effort to achieve world power via eastward expansion,
his work seems most prescient. His idea also neatly depicts the position, and perhaps
the aims, of the Russians after World War II and throughout the Cold War. That to this
day perceived Russian expansionism still generates close interest, much concern—and
the occasional international crisis—suggests the continuing relevance of Mackinder’s
thinking.
Thus were the ideas of Mahan, the great champion of maritime supremacy, challenged
by Mackinder, the critical questioner who believed that continental power had the potential
to prevail in world affairs. If these two were, respectively, thesis and antithesis, then a third
strand of thought introduced during the same period, the notion of a crucially important
“rimland,” provided a kind of Hegelian synthesis. It was Yale Professor Nicholas Spykman
who advanced the rimland concept, the main contention of which was that the lands and
seas on the immediate edges of the heartland were the true pivot of history, control of which
would determine the course of world events.
Spykman’s analysis was quite sophisticated, even allowing for and explaining why a
heartland power like Russia might align with “rimland Britain” against another aggressive
rimland power—such as France in the early nineteenth century, or Germany in the twentieth
century. The key, per Spykman, was to control the littorals of Eurasia, what Mahan called
the “debated and debatable zone” in which land and sea powers contested on relatively
equal terms. And Spykman’s firm belief was that the rimland could contain the heartland.
This formulation has led some to see him as a progenitor, even before George Kennan, of
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With the foregoing in mind, one should think of Spykman as being
deterministic—whereas Mackinder is not. Indeed, it is important to note that Mackinder
did not see the triumph of continental power over sea power as inevitable. What he ob-
served, rather, was that technological, economic, and political conditions in the world of
the twentieth century seemed to be moving in a direction favoring land power—much as
he recognized that the state of play for these factors in the nineteenth century had favored
the preeminence of sea power.
Despite his thoughtfully reasoned and carefully qualified lines of argument, Mackinder
was advancing ideas that were absolutely iconoclastic. As a major text on political geogra-
phy put it, “Mackinder’s land power thesis which, appearing at what seemed to be the height
of the Victorian sea power age, seemed shocking and fantastic.”33 But the course of the
major wars over the past century has nonetheless borne out his key point about the ongoing
struggle between continental and maritime powers. That the latter prevailed, narrowly, in
both world wars, hardly disproves the land power thesis. To explain the outcomes of these
conflicts, Spykman would no doubt simply note that each of the world wars featured a great
heartland power (Russia) aligning with rimland powers to defeat another “rimlander.”
As to the Cold War, this too seems a struggle—largely ideational and economic, at its
core—whose outcome was driven by the steady, sturdy alliance of rimland powers that were
able to outlast the will and resources of their continental challenger, the Soviet Union. Still,
the Russians were able to operate on a global basis and had their innings in many proxy wars
throughout the period from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. In the end, though, someone
taking the sea-power side of the debate can point out that Mahan’s formulations about the
likelihood that maritime powers will prevail in protracted conflicts are clearly borne out in
this case. Indeed, Colin Gray has provided just such an analysis—and affirmation—of the
role of sea power in the twentieth century:
The twentieth century has seen the leverage of sea power challenged by the
rise of great industrialized continental states, the invention and development of
the airplane, and most recently the coming of nuclear weapons. Experience has
shown, however, that reports of the strategic demise or even obsolescence of
sea power have been greatly exaggerated. Sea power in this century has coopted
or otherwise neutralized every takeover challenge that has appeared.34
Will Mahan continue to trump Mackinder in the twenty-first century? Perhaps. But
clearly, the ideas of both will continue to matter a great deal. The key to solving this
particular puzzle, though, may actually lie in the third great strategic debate—which is
about short v. long wars. If maritime powers can hold out long enough, as in the Napoleonic
era and during the world wars, they generally prevail.
Short v. Long Wars
The leading German historian Hans Delbrück—a contemporary of Mahan and
Mackinder—divided wars into two fundamental types: those of “annihilation” (Nieder-
werfungsstrategie), in which a swift end is sought through decisive battle; and those of
“exhaustion” (Ermattungsstrategie), where the aim is to wear down the opponent via a
long series of battles, maneuvers, blockades, and the like. In his magisterial multi-volume
History of the Art of War, Delbrück pointed to Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon as the
best practitioners of decisive battle. The masters of attrition, in his view, were Pericles of





































192 J. Arquilla and R. Nomura
the Thirty Years’ War—and Frederick the Great. Delbrück’s listing of Frederick as a master
of attritional warfare brought down upon him, as Gordon Craig put it, “a flood of angry
criticism . . . The most vocal of his critics were the historians of the [German] general staff
who [were] convinced that the strategy of annihilation was the only correct strategy.”35
One of those German military historians who criticized Delbrück was Friedrich von
Bernhardi, who was also an accomplished soldier who had distinguished himself early on
in the Franco-Prussian War and, at the end of his career, served extremely effectively as a
general on both the Eastern and Western fronts during World War I. More than anyone else
at the time, Bernhardi was the great advocate of decisive battle. His basic line of reasoning
was that the sheer size of modern armies, their destructive power, and the great complexity
of their logistical support and command control systems made it both essential, and likely,
that decisive action would ensue very quickly at the outset of a major conflict. As he put it
shortly before the outbreak of war in August 1914: “It is inherent in the nature of war itself
that we must proceed offensively as far as circumstances will ever admit; we must strive to
gain a victory as rapidly as possible.”36
Bernhardi may have been the most ardent believer in the likelihood of and need for a
short war, but he was clearly not alone in his views. His German colleagues were completely
steeped in this notion, the Schlieffen Plan that they undertook at the outset of World War
I being the clearest manifestation of their faith in the short-war concept.37 And the vast
majority of professional soldiers serving the other European powers also concurred with
Bernhardi about the need to attack from the outset and seek a swift victory. This view was so
widely held that historian Theodore Ropp focused on French Marshal Joffre’s phrase “the
cult of the offensive” to describe the persistent, almost mindless devotion to seeking out a
grand decisive battle—a goal still blindly pursued even after years of senseless slaughter
on the Western Front.38
This school of thought seemed quite consistent with Clausewitz’s emphasis on the need
to seek battle under advantageous conditions. What Bernhardi brought to the discourse was
the subtle insight that industrialization, with its mass production and transport systems,
would result in a far more sizeable proportion of a nation’s capabilities coming into the
field much sooner. Added to this, the scale and complexity of modern field operations meant
that conditions could easily become “disadvantageous,” so Bernhardi and his adherents at
home and abroad believed that it was imperative to seek a rapid decision in war.
The most articulate argument against the short-war concept was advanced by Ivan
Bloch, also known as Jean de Bloch, a Polish banker who had served as an advisor to the
Tsar on supply and transport during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78). However, in his
La Guerre Future, Bloch focused less on the complexity associated with the movement of
large forces and supplies by rail and other logistics-related matters, and more on the range,
accuracy, and killing power of weapons—which he believed would wreak absolute havoc
upon an attacking army. He took the position that “it will be impossible for the battle of the
future to be fought out rapidly.”39
Bloch went on to predict with uncanny clarity of vision what would transpire in the next
great conflict—not a fast-paced, decisive campaign but rather a mutually exhausting war of
attrition. He foresaw “increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible
to push the battle to a decisive issue . . . [followed by] a long period of increasing strain
upon the resources of the combatants.”40 In the opinion of Michael Howard, Bloch’s work
was full of “astonishing insights” and constituted a “remarkably accurate blueprint for the
war which was to break out in Europe in 1914.”41 Bloch’s foresight should be seen as even





































Three Wars of Ideas about the Idea of War 193
Thus, even though most professional soldiers concurred with Bernhardi’s views—to
their great detriment—what we might call the substantive aspect of the short v. long war
debate clearly went to Bloch over Bernhardi and his adherents. And, as to the blitzkrieg-era
German strategists of the 1930s, who came to believe that they had rediscovered a recipe
for winning short wars—like those victories attained by Prussian arms against Austria in
1866 and France in 1870—the great panzer thrusts into Poland, France, and Russia during
World War II did little to avoid a long war. For Britain’s sea power kept the home island
safe from invasion, and enabled empire resources to be brought into play. Russia, the
quintessential heartland power, was able to trade space for time, while American “rimland”
capabilities—sea, air, and land —also came to the conflict. Thus, in the end, blitzkrieg
foundered as a short-war formula because, as Gwynne Dyer has observed: “No innovation
in warfare stays a surprise for very long, and by the middle of the war, when German forces
were fighting deep inside the Soviet Union, attrition had returned with a vengeance.”42
Clearly, World War II also provides some evidence of the interplay between the debates
about land–sea conflicts and short and long wars. In this instance, Germany was also in
violation of Spykman’s guidance to avoid being opposed by a coalition consisting of both
continental and maritime powers—the worst of all worlds. Japan, as Spykman put it,
was similarly “encircled” geostrategically.43 In the end, the Germans were not so much
outfought as gang-tackled—a situation that befell them due to the mistaken belief that they
were positioned to win a short war despite their geopolitical position being so vulnerable
as to militate against this possibility.
Japanese grand strategy, when viewed through the lens of the land v. sea power and
short v. long war debates, reflects a similar sort of fuzzy thinking, given that the Kido Butai
began the Pacific War with a carrier-based form of naval/amphibious blitzkrieg—landing
a series of swift, stunning blows from Pearl Harbor to Singapore. But the core Japanese
concept was about being able to wage a long war under favorable conditions, the prospective
costs of which, they hoped, would deter American counterattacks against the defensive
perimeter that they had created. Their intent was to be able to strike out from time to
time at different points along this perimeter, a strategy that was discarded after defeat at
Midway—a fatal mistake. As Ronald Spector has noted, “The Japanese still had sufficient
forces after Midway to again take the offensive . . . Instead they reverted to the defensive.”44
Thus was their fate sealed.
A static defensive—save for occasional “rice offensives” in China and a misguided
effort to push from Burma on to India—was hardly the correct choice for dealing with an
opponent so outraged by the manner in which the war had begun. But the Japanese had failed
to reckon with one of the key formulations from Clausewitz’s On War—the “passions of
the people.” The cost of rolling back Japanese conquests, and the bitter fighting that would
be required to do so, were simply not issues for the American people. Severe punishment
of the aggressor was all that mattered after Pearl Harbor.
This point about national will is crucially important. Even Hans Delbrück was aware of
this factor, noting its salience as far back as the Second Punic War. He used the example of
Hannibal, who had won a great victory at Cannae, destroying a major Roman field army in
one of the most superbly conducted battles in all the history of armed conflict. Yet even the
great Carthaginian captain found himself still embroiled in a long war, because the Roman
people, despite the defection of some allies, refused to lose heart. Hannibal continued
to roam Italy for over a decade, winning battles here and there, but never achieving his
aim. As Delbrück put it, Hannibal “said to the Romans that it was not a war of complete
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to discuss peace terms. The Romans rejected the offer.”45 And in the long war that dragged
on, it was the legions that eventually prevailed.
Indeed, the staying power of the Roman soldier was clearly reflected in the composition
of the expeditionary force that invaded North Africa and won the great battle at Zama that
ensued. It was largely made up of survivors of the great defeat at Cannae.46 We also
note that Rome retained its naval mastery—initially gained in the First Punic War (264-
241B.C.E.)—throughout the sixteen years (218–202 B.C.E.) of the Second.
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the wake of the German invasion of Russia in
June 1941. Their panzers won huge “cauldron” battles of encirclement, again and again, in
the opening months of the war, with Russian losses in killed, wounded, or captured quickly
approaching five million.47 German casualties were about one-fifth this number. Vast tracts
of territory were overrun as well. Some of this was due to German skill; but just as big a
role was played by Soviet blunders. Yet the war went on and the Russians ultimately won,
thanks to the sheer grit of their soldiery. Alan Clark summed up their resilience this way:
Foremost must come the ordinary Russian soldier. Abominably led, inade-
quately trained, poorly equipped, he changed the course of history by his
courage and tenacity in the first year of fighting.48
In both the Roman and the Russian examples, horrendous early defeats in the field were
overcome by finding ways to prolong these wars. The Romans relied on “Fabian” delaying
tactics49 in Italy – i.e., on avoiding main battles while raiding and otherwise harrying the
enemy—and used their sea power both to make it hard for Carthage to reinforce Hannibal
and eventually to launch counter-offensives of their own under the command of Publius
Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus) in Spain and North Africa. Two millennia later, the
Russians traded space to gain time to rebuild, slowly wearing the Germans down, while
their Western allies used sea power to strike at vulnerable points of the Nazi imperium
along the occupied Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. Plus ça change . . .
Guerrilla wars have also tended to follow this pattern of “temporal extension.” Napoleon
overran Spain quickly in 1808, but his forces were soon caught in the toils of an extremely
bitter insurgency that lasted until the French were expelled several years later. At the turn of
the twentieth century in South Africa, British forces beat the Boers in open battle; but the
Afrikaaners’ irregular small-unit Kommandos fought on with much skill and great effect
for years thereafter. As the twentieth century unfolded, Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap,
and other guerrilla leaders all strove in their times and places to win by ensuring that their
conflicts would be protracted. Lewis Gann saw this pattern clearly in his survey of irregular
warfare, and it led him to conclude: “The successful guerrilla must be resigned to waging
a long drawn-out war.”50
No doubt the same can be said of terrorists. Today al Qaeda seeks to win a long war, and
there has been some recognition of this long-war notion on the part of American strategic
leadership as well. However, it has proved hard to sustain “the passions of the people”
opposed to terrorism, given the open-ended nature of this first protracted conflict between
nations and terror networks—as can be seen by the complete withdrawal of U.S. military
forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, and the relatively muted American reaction to the
resurgence of extremism in that sad land. The looming departure of most of the security
assistance force from Afghanistan is yet another example of how a lack of “passion” for
the cause undermines the ability to sustain the fight.51
On balance, it seems that decisive short wars have been more the exception than the
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result was to be a rare one—even for the Israeli Defense Forces, who soon after were
mired in an irregular war of attrition (1969–1970) and then had a very close call in the
Yom Kippur War of 1973. Next they invaded Lebanon in 1982 and were subjected to some
eighteen years of insurgent operations by Hezbollah guerrillas, who finally impelled the
IDF to withdraw. Six years later, the Israelis thought better of staying on again in Lebanon
after their thirty-three-day incursion in 2006, withdrawing after another hard fight with
Hezbollah irregulars. Simply put, short wars are still around—e.g., see also the five-day
Russo-Georgian War of 2008—but are becoming ever harder to find. And, as the most
recent Israeli experience in Lebanon suggests, the outcome of the short war may not be as
expected; i.e., the much more powerful side may not always emerge clearly victorious.
So it seems that Bloch still trumps Bernhardi and others who have chased the chimera
of the short war. While most of the discussion in this section has been about fighting
on land, this assessment of the debate seems to apply very well to air power, too. Its
early advocates—most notably the Italian Giulio Douhet, but he had adherents in many
nations—tended to agree strongly with Bernhardi, the thought being that strategic bom-
bardment of the enemy homeland would swiftly bring about material and psychological
collapse. This, coupled with the belief that, as Bernard Brodie once observed of air power
advocates, that air forces are “incomparably powerful on offense,”52 has inspired quite a
number of strategic bombing campaigns over the past century. But almost none of them
have been decisive, from the London Blitz to the bombing of Germany and Japan during
World War II, to the leveling of Pyongyang during the Korean conflict, and on to massive
air attacks on Hanoi, Belgrade and, most recently, Iraq during the American-led invasion
in 2003.53
It is interesting to note that even the specter of nuclear devastation, steeped for so long
in notions of a spasmodic “mutual assured destruction,” has featured a long-war variant as
well. It was stated succinctly in Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Directive 59, which outlined
a way to pursue protracted nuclear warfare by focusing attacks solely on military targets,
the key idea being that more skillful, accurate aim at “counterforce” capabilities might
cripple an enemy, allowing a nuclear war to come to an end, over time, absent a result of
civilization-destroying Armageddon.54
For the most part, this idea of protracted nuclear war was rejected, not least by Ronald
Reagan, who put it bluntly: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
Still, the counterforce approach—versus the notion of simply aiming at population cen-
ters, so-called “countervalue” targets—in support of more protracted operations may be
inadvertently reinvigorated by current efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals sharply.
Were this to happen, then a carefully crafted counterforce campaign might well come to
the fore again, since it would be possible to think about disabling an adversary’s nuclear
capabilities without having to incinerate population centers. As James Schlesinger and
Keith Payne have put it in their analysis of the “deep reductions” school of thought,
Claims of effective deterrence at very low force levels appear to ignore the
reality that the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. deterrent forces may on
some critical occasions be tied to the flexibility and diversity of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, and thus to its size.55
To close this survey of the long v. short war debate, we must also consider how it
plays out at sea. Naval strategists a century ago, so steeped in Mahanian ideas, were deeply
divided on this subject. Mahan was, too. He was very willing to note the utterly decisive
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Trafalgar during the Napoleonic era. But at the same time he observed that these “decisive
engagements” only settled a preliminary matter: command of the sea. Both these wars
dragged on many years after the seemingly decisive naval clash. For Mahan, blockade, a
quintessential long-war tool, was the ultimate key to victory.
This ambivalence about how to wield sea power was also manifested from the outset of
World War I, when Winston Churchill held that the Commander of the Royal Navy’s Grand
Fleet. Admiral John Jellicoe was “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an
afternoon.”56 In light of this dire possibility, the British preferred to eschew such a risk and
emphasized blockade instead. The Germans seemed similarly skittish, generally avoiding
a major fleet confrontation and relying instead on a counter-blockade with U-boats. But
when a titanic clash did occur nearly two years on in the war, the Germans won the Battle
of Jutland tactically—the Royal Navy’s losses in ships and men were shockingly high.57
Yet the war was not lost in an afternoon. And the blockade of Germany remained in place
unbroken, given the correlation of forces at the time, and the Germans were ultimately
“exhausted” in the long war that dragged on for two-and-a-half years after Jutland.
The story of sea power in World War II is similar, with the Western Allies—those
Spykman labeled rimland powers—imposing a blockade from the outset. The German
counter-effort came primarily in terms of another U-boat campaign. Thus, both sides
clearly reflected dominant long-war views. Even the Japanese maritime blitzkrieg in the
Far East, as we noted earlier, was designed to create a security zone that would compel the
Allies to wage a long war against the Imperial Navy.
Overall, then, it seems that in conflicts on land, in the air, and at sea, the long-war
paradigm has prevailed. And while there have been a relative handful of short, sharp,
land wars, the insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—and now, apparently, the covert warriors
aligned with Russian strategic interests—who dominate today’s landscape of conflict have
all focused on Delbrück’s notion of winning by wearing down their enemies. Indeed, so
much so that, in an age replete with irregular wars, it seems that the triumph of the long-war
notion heralds an era of perpetual conflict.
Two Key Interconnections and Conclusions Drawn from Them
Perhaps the most important connecting point among the three strategic debates we have
explored herein is the tight linkage between national will—that is, the concept of the
“passion of the people” that was so important to Clausewitz—and the notion of the “long
war.” This relationship strikes at both the Jominian view that adherence to particular
principles will most often lead to victory, and the school of thought that blossomed—from
Bernhardi to the advocates of blitzkrieg—in support of the notion that technological change
had brought the principles of the offensive and maneuver to the forefront of military and
strategic affairs and made the waging of “short wars” a real possibility, even a necessity. In
all too many cases, though, we have seen that an asymmetry of motivation redounds to the
benefit of the more determined side in a conflict—despite material, technological, or other
deficiencies. Historian Peter Paret summarized Clausewitz’s view about the preeminence of
the passions of the people this way: “The raw emotions that provide energy for all effective
action [in war] rest in society.”58
We have also seen how elusive the short war itself has been—even before the current
age of protracted conflicts between nations and networks. The massive numbers of troops
mobilized by the Allies and the Central Powers in August 1914 did not, as expected,
result in a swift resolution via decisive battle. Instead, a hard, four-year slog unfolded.
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supposed to win short, sharp wars—yet another long struggle ensued once all parties began
using similar weapons systems and tactics. After World War II, the world’s remaining
colonial powers—and later the superpowers—saw their material advantages largely offset
by determined insurgents. Short wars are hardly to be found in any of these realms.
Today, some (the authors included) see the possibility of the skillful use of advanced
information systems—and of the crippling of adversary communications, by cyber and other
means—as offering yet another chance to resurrect the short-war notion through innovations
in the Jominian “maneuver” principle.59 The shift, in this case, would be from blitzkrieg
to what we call bitskrieg. Some small evidence of the potential of this mode of conflict
may have been on display in the Russo-Georgian War (2008), in which Russian attacks
on Georgian information systems created serious disruptions that degraded the latter’s
military effectiveness sharply. Indeed, the Georgian military leadership itself admitted that
its critical “inability to communicate effectively in combat” was the proximate cause of
defeat.60 The Russians would most likely have won this war under any circumstances; but
their skillful use of cyber and other means of disrupting Georgia’s command and control
processes brought success more swiftly and at lesser cost.
It is important not to attach too much weight to Russian field and information operations
in 2008, as an eventual “leveling” may occur. This was the case with rail mobility, when
the skillful German practices that did so much to enable the great victories in the Seven
Weeks’ War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) could not be replicated in
1914—because their opponents had learned to mobilize just as fast, and millions on both
sides poured swiftly into the field, which soon became a bloody quagmire. The same
fate awaited armored blitzkrieg. After big wins in Poland, France, and early on in Russia
(1939–1941), a reaction set in during which Allied maneuver warfare capabilities matched
those of the Germans. Thus, the result of even very big innovations seems to have been a
relatively short run of dominance in the field. Perhaps a very skillful form of bitskrieg will
emerge and, like previous advances in military affairs, see some initial success. Still, it too
may ultimately prove a “wasting asset.”
On balance, then, this connection between the passion of the people and the long-war
concept seems to overmatch the idea that advances in the principles of war can enable
conflicts to be waged sharply and won swiftly. And so in this particular strategic tag-team
match-up, Clausewitz and Bloch have the edge over Jomini and Bernhardi. That said,
technological advances continually come on the scene in ways that do increase the pace
and complexity of operations, opening up the possibility of victory in short, sharp wars.
A second important linkage is also to the notion of long wars—this time with sea power.
Naval mastery seems made for protracted conflict, both in terms of enabling the leading
sea power to withstand a big land power’s initial blows, and then in terms of gathering
up the resources required to prevail over time. It is crucial, though, that we not dismiss
Mackinder’s heartland theory—especially not now, given the resurgence of Russia in world
power politics after a few decades of quiescence in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. If the world wars of the twentieth century offer any particular lesson in this issue
area, it is that continental powers have the potential to become quite formidable at sea.
The German U-boats came perilously close to winning each conflict. The Cold War never
became truly hot, so we cannot say with certainty how the Russians would have performed
at sea. But they too would have posed a very serious naval challenge in a shooting war.
And if we are willing to cast our gaze all the way back to ancient and medieval times,
there are the alarming lessons to be drawn from land powers that, in long-enough periods of
conflict, were able to transform themselves into victorious sea powers: Athens over Persia;
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has not been repeated in modern times—yet—but is worth keeping in mind, especially in
an era in which high politics and military affairs may be dominated by the rise of China and
the return of Russia—two continental powers with robust and growing naval capabilities.
Mackinder still matters, even if Mahan still prevails.
A concluding thought prompted by some consideration of these interconnections is
that they are of especially lively relevance to our world today. Take, for example, the
linkage between energizing the passions of the people and tying it to a long-war concept.
Clearly this was the idea behind the al Qaeda strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Global Islamic
Resistance Call. His basic plan has been to mobilize jihadis at an emotional level, with a
powerful narrative about the excesses of foreign military powers in Muslim lands, and of
the corruption of the “apostate” governments they put in place.
After mobilization, al-Suri envisions a “global swarm” emerging over many years,
enlivened by countless semi-autonomous cells located around the world, with the network
eventually overwhelming nations’ abilities to cope with this mode of conflict.61 It is fas-
cinating to note that, in response, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and the head of the Special Operations Command came together to craft a
document that puts “the passions of the people” at the center of American strategic thought.
In their phrasing, “the significance of the ‘human domain’ in future conflict is growing,
not diminishing.”62 Thus the “heartland” that Mackinder saw in geographical terms is now
complemented by the complexities of the human heart.
That said, the more traditional notion of the heartland must not be forgotten, nor
dismissed due to complacency or undue faith in the ultimate triumph of sea power over
continental challengers. As the historical record amply shows, land powers have sometimes
gone to sea successfully. On other occasions, as in the world wars, they have come very close
to victory. And in a time when the quintessential heartland power, Russia, is reasserting itself
forcefully, it seems clear that the long struggle between land and sea may resume. Indeed,
the strategic equipoise between the two may elevate the importance of nations that can
wield influence in both realms. China comes to mind first, and it may be that both Moscow
and Washington should be contemplating the possibility that the “holder of the balance”
resides in Beijing. India, a purer “rimland” power, will also prove important—a point that
recent American diplomacy toward New Delhi seems to affirm. But President Obama’s
“pivot to the Pacific” appears aimed more at containment of, rather than engagement with,
China—leaving an opening for Russia to exploit. Thus does the Mahan–Mackinder debate
still resonate.
No doubt there are other linkages across the three major strategic debates to discover
and explore. In this regard, we hope that this brief exposition of some key “wars of ideas
about the idea of war” will serve to stimulate a continuing, ever-improving discourse.
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